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Abstract The Internet of Things (IoT) is able to provide a prediction of linked, universal, and smart 
nodes that have autonomous interaction when they present services. Because of wide openness, 
relatively high processing power, and wide distribution of IoT things, they are ideal for attacks of the 
gray hole. In the gray hole attack, the attacker fakes itself as the shortest path to the destination that is 
a thing here. This causes the routing packets don’t reach the destination. The proposed method is 
based on the AODV routing protocol and is presented under the MTISS-IoT name which means for  
the reduction of gray hole attacks using check node information. In this paper, a hybrid approach is 
proposed based on cryptographic authentication. The proposed approach consists of four Phases, such 
as the verifying node trust in the IoT, testing the routes, gray hole attack discovery, and the malicious 
attack elimination process in MTISS-IoT. The method is evaluated here via extensive simulations 
carried out in the NS-3 environment. The experimental results of four scenarios demonstrated that the 
MTISS-IoT method can achieve a false-positive rate of 14.104 percent, a false-negative rate of 17.49 
percent and a detection rate of 94.5 percent when gray hole attack was launched. 
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1 Introduction 
IoT forms a system through interconnecting various machines, devices, and software services. IoT 
can increase the quality of human life and play a significant role in today’s modern life since through 
energy-efficient automation. It should be noted that since IoT systems are resource-constrained and 
have an ad-hoc nature can be influenced by cyber attackers [1]. This necessitates designing reliable 
and secure IoT, and the challenges should be overcome so that other systems and human lives are 
not damaged or destroyed. Some attacks like a gray hole attack have illegal penetration into the 
system. When an attack affects an IoT, it is difficult to remove the threat and bring the system back 
online. It should be noted that the conventional approaches for securing information like intrusion 
detection or encryption are not adequate when these risks are dealt. The sensor and actuator 
measurements compatibility factor with IoT control mechanism and the physical process are not 
taken into account in these plans. These cases are essential for the protection scheme. Due to the 
high volume of sensing and network data generated by IoT systems and devices, it is very effective 
to have cryptographic authentication in constant monitoring and analysis for the IoT systems’ 
security. For instance, as observed in Fig. 1, a gray hole attacker can strive to imitate the wireless 
router connecting the IoT devices with the rest of the network. Then, it can reroute the traffic by the 
legal wireless router. 
 
Fig. 1 IoT gray hole attacks based on application scenarios 
 
    In this paper, a gray hole attack discovery and prevention method via informing other nodes in the 
internet of things is proposed. The proposed scheme first verifies the trust level for the nodes in the 
network and then discovers and eliminates the malicious gray hole nodes using control packets. The 
proposed method is based on the AODV routing protocol and is presented under the MTISS-IoT 
name which stands for the reduction of gray hole attacks using check node information. 
    The paper presented here is organized as the following. Section 2 converses the security attacks 
for IoT networks. The related work is discussed in Section 3. In Sect. 4 brings the proposed MTISS-
IoT strategy. In Section 5, the simulation results are discussed to demonstrate the efficiency of the 
proposed MTISS-IoT. Finally, conclusions and future works of this research are discussed in Section 
6. 
 
2 Security attacks 
IoT Systems are vulnerable to function degradation and security risks. They might be passive or 
active threats as they have the reliance on wireless channels for communication. A security threat 
targeting IoT is provided in Figures 2 and 3. In this paper, the following vulnerability is of interest: 
Gray hole Attack: In a gray hole attack, there is a malicious node among the selected path nodes that 
drops the messages and don’t forward them to the adjacent nodes. In this regard, two possibilities 
can be mentioned. In the first possibility, the gray hole node fakes itself as a routing node by 
observing the routing protocol accurately. In another possibility, the attackers don’t observe the 
routing protocol and so that it violates the protocol specifications by exploiting its vulnerabilities. 
The gray hole node fakes itself as a routing node in different ways based on the used protocol. The 
gray hole attacks can be divided into two groups based on the number of malicious nodes—simple 
and cooperative gray hole [2]. 
 
Simple gray hole attack: In this kind of gray hole attack, a malicious node foists itself as a medium 
node that belongs to the shortest route to the destination. Regardless of the routing table, the gray 
hole node is always accessible to reply route requests to receive data packets and drop them instead 
of forwarding them. In the flooding-based protocols, before sending a reply by healthy nodes, the 
gray hole node sends a reply to the requesting node. In this way, the selected route will contain a 
malicious node which drops the packets or send them to incorrect nodes. The process of a gray hole 
attack is shown in Fig. 2. As seen in this figure, the data packets should be transferred from a source
STh to a destination DTh . For this purpose, a proper route—from the origin to the destination—should 
be detected.  So, if MTh is malicious, it fakes itself as a node present in the shortest path to the 
destination. Then, it will respond to the request by sending a reply to the STh  sooner than other nodes. 
in this way, the STh will send the data packets to MTh and discard the replies received from other nodes 
[3]. 
Fig. 2 Simple gray hole attack. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cooperative gray hole attack: Cooperative gray hole attack is the other way of implementing a gray 
hole attack where there is cooperation among different malicious nodes in the attack for violating the 
security system and routing protocol. As indicated in Fig. 3, when malicious 1 2  M MTh and Th cooperate,
1MTh refers to 2MTh as its subsequent hop. Given the scenario described in [4], the source SThing
transfers a Further Request packet (
packetFReq ) to 2MTh by another route other than via 1MTh  (for 
example,
2S C E MTh Th Th Th− − − ). The SThing requests 2MTh if it is the subsequent hop of 1MTh and if it has a 
reliable path to the destination
DTh . As there is a cooperation between the 2MTh and 1MTh , its Further 
Reply (
packetFReq ) is positive. Thus, it is assumed by the source STh  that the path 1 2S M MTh Th Th− − has 
security, and it begins transferring the data packets over it. 1MTh will drop the packets following being 
intercepted.  
 
Fig. 3 Cooperative gray hole attack. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Related works 
Various security measurements have been developed and used in different works for addressing 
Denial of Sleep attacks, and protecting IoTs against gray hole attacks. It is not a recent issue, and 
there are extensive studies on it. Different approaches have been suggested by different studies in 
order to address these attacks.   
   In this paper, a new real-time hybrid intrusion detecting frame-work is provided including 
specification-oriented and anomaly-based intrusion detecting modules to detect two well-known 
routing attacks in IoT known as selective-forwarding and sinkhole attacks. Hence, the host nodes’ 
behavior is analyzed by the specification-oriented intrusion detecting elements situated in the router 
nodes, and their local outcomes are sent to the root node via normal data packets. Furthermore, the 
unverified optimal-path forest algorithm is used by an anomaly-oriented intrusion detection agent 
situated in the root node to project clustering models via incoming data packets. This agent that is on 
the basis of the MapReduce architecture is able to act in a distributed platform to project clustering 
models and therefore detect parallelly the anomalies as a global detection method. By the suggested 
technique, decisions are made regarding suspicious performance via a voting mechanism. Remarkably, 
the suggested technique is also prolonged for detecting wormhole attack. Deploying the hybrid 
suggested model is also assessed in a smart-city scenario via a present platform. The scale of the free 
network and the capability in identifying malevolent nodes are two key properties of the suggested 
framework that are assessed via various tests in this work [5]. 
     Here, the authors provide an algorithm in terms of the exponential smoothing concept for detecting 
the nodes’ topological isolation owing to blackhole attack. Exponential smoothing is a method to 
smooth time series data utilizing the exponential window function and it is utilized for short, medium 
and long-term prediction. We use the exponential smoothing in our suggested algorithm to 
approximate the next onset time of packets at the sink node from each of other nodes in the LLN. This 
estimation is used to design the algorithm for identifying the malevolent nodes initiating real blackhole 
attack [6]. 
     In [7], SCOTRES—a trust-oriented system is proposed for secure routing in ad-hoc networks to 
advance the network entities’ intelligence using 5 innovative metrics. The resource consumption of 
each node is considered by the energy metric to impose similar quantity of collaboration and to 
increase the network’s lifetime. The topology metric knows the positions of the nodes and improves 
the load balancing. The tolerance in periodic malfunctioning is provided by channel-health metric 
owing to bad channel circumstances and the network is protected versus jamming attacks. The 
collaboration of each subject for a particular network operation is evaluated by reputation metric to 
detect the specific attacks, however, the total compliance is estimated by trust metric, protecting 
against combinatorial attacks. The system’s security features are validated by the Theoretic analysis.     
     Blackhole and selective forwarding routing attacks are addressed in [8], which are the basis 
security attacks on the data routing in IoT networks. Today, most IoT tools, from medical instruments 
to connected vehicles and even smart buildings are able to communicate with each other wirelessly. In 
this work, a trust-oriented routing Protocol is provided for Lossy and Low-Power Networks stating 
blackhole and selective forwarding attacks. We indicate that our suggested protocol is secured from 
blackhole and selective forwarding attacks, and it does not enforce undue overheads on network 
traffic. 
     In [9], a comprehensive study of RPL, its known attacks are represented and the mitigation 
approaches are suggested to counter these attacks. We performed a complete review of the RPL 
standard, containing a currently suggested modification. Moreover, all recently published attacks on 
RPL and their mitigation approaches were investigated within the literature. According to this 
assessment, and as we know, this is a first-of-its-kind categorizing outline for the mitigation 
approaches in terms of the methods utilized for the mitigation. Moreover, we systematically 
deliberated RP-oriented Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) and their categorizations, while remarking 
the most lately suggested IDSs. 
     This work suggested constructing a trust-oriented framework for RPL to counter blackhole attacks. 
It can be run at two levels of an intra-DODAG and an inter-DODAG. Incremented dropping the 
packets, depleting the resources, and high packet overhead are the impacts of blackhole attacks in an 
IoT network. It eventually leads to destabilizing the network owing to incremented packet delay, rank 
modifying and disturbance in the topology. Regarding the rank modifying, the ranks are computed 
again, therefore, activating a local repair later initiating a repair thoroughly by the root. Such regular 
repairs might end up influencing the network efficiency [10]. 
     In [11], SIEWE (Strainer based Intrusion Detection of Blackhole in 6LoWPAN for the Internet of 
Things) an Intrusion detection mechanism is proposed to recognize Blackhole attack on Routing 
protocol RPL in IoT. To arrange the Blackhole attack, a malevolent node first should broadcast a 
comparatively great routing metric to the nearby nodes so that it seems to be the best candidate chosen 
as a parent. The above fact is used by SIEWE to filter out the nodes broadcasting a comparatively 
great routing metric and appending their node IDs to a suspect list. Furthermore, detecting and 
verifying are performed by only the nodes with at least one entrance in their suspect list set. The above 
nodes analyze the nodes’ behavior in their respective suspect lists while sending their observations to 
BR node. Therefore, SIEWE includes only those nodes in the vicinity of suspected nodes rather than 
involving every resource inhibited node in the network for detecting and verifying procedure. Hence, 
overall consumed energy is saved by SIEWE within the network and the number of observation 
packets moved to BR node is limited.  
     SPLIT, a secure and scalable RPL routing protocol is proposed in [12] for IoT networks. A 
lightweight remote attestation method is effectively utilized by SPLIT to guarantee the network nodes’ 
software integrity. SPLIT piggybacks attestation are processed on the RPL’s control messages to 
prevent further overhead resultant by attestation messages. Consequently, SPLIT benefits the RPL 
protocol’s scalability propertied and low energy consumption that are essential for the resource-
constrained large-scale networks like IoT. The simulation outcomes for various IoT setups indicate the 
SPLIT effectiveness in comparison with the state-of-the-art by existing various kinds of attacks 
regarding metrics like energy consumption and packet delivery ratio. 
    One of the methods offered to detect and dispel a DoS attack in contrast to the IoT middleware—
which is also known as NPS—is the REATO method. A real test-bed is used to authenticate the 
premeditated solution for NPS architecture. This solution is composed of an NPS sample mounted on 
a Raspberry Pi which receives open data feeds in real-time using an adaptable source set. To find a 
solution to detect DoS attacks in the IoT, it should be noted that we should consider all the potential 
circumstances—attacks to the data sources and IoT platform) [13]. 
    A deep-learning established machine learning method has been presented in [14] for the IoT to 
detect the routing attacks. The Cooja IoT emulator has been employed to generate high-fidelity attack 
data within IoT networks having 10 to 1000 nodes. They have recommended a highly scalable, 
profound-learning based attack detection approach to uncover the IoT routing attacks which are 
decreased rank, hello-flood, and version number modification attacks through extraordinary 
accurateness and meticulousness. Applying the deep learning for cyber-security in the IoT necessitates 
the accessibility of considerable IoT attack data. 
    Qin et al. [15] proposed an IMLADS to manage the security of the IoT in a well-organized manner. 
This method differs from the traditional systems so that it employs the movable agents—instead of 
stationary one—to complete the data collection and analysis stages. in this way, the movable agent 
running platform controls the mobility despite the fact that that is irrelevant to its setup system. The 
data can be transferred to the other nodes based on a pre-set monitoring task. By taking advantage of 
this technology, the number of agents running in the system can be increased significantly while 
enhancing the steadiness and scalability of the system. Therefore, various approaches have been 
designed by the authors of the mentioned study for node and system-level security monitoring. In the 
first approach, they employed a lightweight data collection and analysis method. It should be noted 
that only small local computing resources can be dominated by this method. In the second approach, 
they proposed a parameter calculation technique. However, this approach has perpetual computational 
complexities.  
     The previous works to design IDS for the IoT have been listed in Table 1 (”-” indicates the 
indefinite characteristics). 
 
 
Table 1 Summary of the approaches for IoT literature. 
References Detection schema Attack type Validation schema 
[5] Hybrid Routing attacks Simulation 
[6] Exponential smoothing Blackhole Attacks Simulation 
[7] Trust-based system Blackhole &jamming attacks Simulation 
[8] Trust-based routing Blackhole & Selective-Forwarding Attacks Simulation 
[9] Hybrid Blackhole & Selective-Forward Attacks none 
[10] Trust-based mechanism Blackhole Attacks Simulation 
[11] Anomaly-based Blackhole Attacks Simulation 
[12] Anomaly-based Hybrid Simulation 
[13] Hybrid DoS attacks (blackhole, …) Test-bed 
[14] deep-learning-based cyber security attacks (blackhole, …) Emprical 
[15] NOS-based Routing attacks Simulation 
 
 
 
 
  
 
4 The proposed MTISS-IoT approach 
In the following section, we design a gray hole-security threats-immune schema by employing the 
cryptographic authentication. The MTISS-IoT consists of four Phases, such as the verifying thing 
trust in the IoT is discussed in Sect, 3.1. Testing the routes is discussed in Sect, 3.2., gray hole thing 
discovery in MTISS-IoT is discussed in Sect. 3.3, and the malicious thing elimination process in 
MTISS-IoT is discussed in Sect. 3.4. 
4.1 The assumptions applied in the proposed MTISS-IoT 
 
4.2 Phase 1: Verifying thing trust in the IoT 
In the proposed MTISS-IoT method, each node monitors the information regarding its immediate 
neighbors, the nodes within a single step distance, and also other nodes in the network using RREQ 
packets. In the proposed MTISS-IoT method, the route discovery process is the same as the base 
AODV method. If the source node needs to discover a route to reach the destination, it broadcasts 
the RREQ packet. According to our proposed method, once an intermediate node receives the RREQ 
packet for a specific destination, it carries out the following actions: 
 For each intermediate node on the RREQ packet route, once receiving this message from a node, 
it increases the ID of that node and its RREQ_C credit field by one (the initial RREQ_C credit value 
is equal to zero) and inserts it into its monitoring table. Then checks whether the RREQ packet is 
duplicate (checks to see if its own ID is listed in the source route). If this is the case, the node drops 
that RREQ packet. Otherwise, if the node has a route to the destination then it submits its request 
into the RREQ packet and sends an RREP packet back to the source node. However, if this is not the 
case and the node does not have a route to the destination, then the node adds its ID to the source 
route and broadcasts the RREQ packet in the network. After sending the RREQ packet to its 
neighboring nodes, the node transfer field (RREQ_T), which has an initial value of zero, is increased 
by one. The RREQ_C credit field for a specific node is increased by its adjacent nodes every time it 
forwards an RREQ packet. Each time a node transmits a packet to one of its neighboring nodes, the 
RREQ_T field for that neighbor is increased by one. This way, each node can collect more 
information about the behavior of other nodes during the route discovery process. Each node sets its 
trust to other nodes to either high or low according to the value of the RREQ_C credit field. The 
monitoring table is also run periodically to represent the current topology and the behavior of the 
network nodes. Table 2, 3, and 4 demonstrates an example of a monitoring table for Figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
The proposed method works under the following assumptions: 
• All of the things are identical in their physical characteristics. 
• If thing X is in the transmission range of thing Y, then thing Y is in the transmission range of thing X too. 
• All of the things have been verified and can take part in the transmissions. 
• Both the source thing and the destination thing are IDS things that are used to detect the malicious thing 
along the route. 
  
Fig. 4 An example of thing layout in the proximity of a suspicious thing in an IoT. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 An example of a monitoring table for Thing 4. 
Thing 4  RREQ_T  RREQ_C  
5 0 0 
8 0 1 
D0 1 0 
 
 
Table 3 An example of a monitoring table for Thing 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 An example of a monitoring table for Thing Do. 
 
 
 
 
 
As presented in these tables, the Do node has received two different RREQ packets from nodes 4 
and 7 but has not sent any packets to node 2. In the meanwhile, it has only sent one packet to node 5 
and eliminated some packets selectively. While other nodes have sent the packet to their neighbors 
normally after receiving it. For instance, node 4 has sent the packet to node Do after receiving it 
from node 8. The trust value X of node X for node Y is calculated using Eq. (1): 
 
 T(X,Y) = The calculated RREQ_C credit by thing A for thing B                                          (1) 
 
According to the AODV routing protocol, a node can eliminate a received RREQ packet only in two 
cases. First, when it receives an RREQ packet that has been received before and the node has already 
broadcast it. Second, when the node receives an RREQ which contains a new route to the requested 
destination. In this case, the node deletes the RREQ packet and sends an RREP to the source node. 
The trust threshold value for a neighbor is represented by CT . Selecting the optimal threshold value is 
Thing 7  RREQ_T  RREQ_C  
6 0 1 
2 1 0 
D0 1 0 
Thing Do  RREQ_T  RREQ_C  
7 0 1 
4 0 1 
2 0 0 
5 1 0 
1 
Do 
2 
5 4 
7 
6 
8 
highly valuable for ensuring the good performance of the network. We analyze this value by testing 
the RREQ packets and with regard to the behavior of the nodes in the network. Node X is trustworthy 
for nodeY if the _RREQ C and _RREQ T columns for node X in the monitoring table of nodeY are 
identical. In other words, it transmits every unique RREQ it receives to its immediate neighbor.  
     For our analysis, we considered a threshold 𝑇𝑐 which is the difference between the RREQ_C and
_RREQ T values for a specific node and its neighbors. Since the gray hole nodes eliminate some 
forwarded RREQ packets, we set the threshold value equal to zero for the nodes that are considered 
normal. This is because the nodes are supposed to transmit every unique RREQ packet they receive. 
In fact, the threshold value is calculated by subtracting the number of RREQ packets transmitted from 
a specific node from the number of RREQ packets transmitted to that node ( _RREQ T ). Eq. (2) 
demonstrates the CT  calculation. 
 
( )T _ _C RREQ T RREQ C= −                                           (2) 
 
    Just as the monitoring table is updated periodically, the behavior of each node is also observed by 
other nodes at specific time intervals. Each node needs to transmit the last RREQ packet it has 
received at different time intervals. Therefore, we say that the trust value for a node is high if the 
trust field of that node is equal to the threshold value, in other words, it sends all of the packets. On 
the other hand, we say that the trust value for a node is low if the trust field for that node is higher 
than the threshold value, i.e., it does not send some of the packets. Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) demonstrates 
this calculation. 
 
    thing   thing    : ( , ) CThe trust value of X for Y is high if T X Y T=                                          (3) 
 
 
    thing   thing    : ( , ) CThe trust value of X for Y is high if T X Y T                                          (4) 
 
In Figure 4, the neighboring nodes of node Do4 (the suspicious node) are nodes 2 and 4. We assume 
that nodes 2 and 4 are normal nodes and node Do is suspected to be a gray hole node. Every node 
except Do will take part in the RREQ packet transmission process normally. However, node Do will 
delete some of the transmitted RREQ packets and therefore its trust value will be higher than zero (
CT ). The trust value for the intermediate nodes and the neighboring nodes of the suspicious node are 
presented in Table 5 These values were calculated after sending the monitoring table and with the 
trust threshold equal to zero. The behavior of the nodes after receiving an RREQ packet is shown in 
Fig 5. 
Table 5 Trust table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Doubtful 
Node  Calculated trust value based on the RREQ_T and RREQ_C fields  
1 High  
2 High  
Do Low  
4 High  
5 High  
  
Fig. 5 The behavior of the nodes after receiving an RREQ packet 
Neighboring node behavior monitoring algorithm when it receives an RREQ packet: 
1. If the receiving node is the destination IDS node: 
i. Highest trust value for all of the nodes along the requested route is calculated 
ii. RREP is sent back to the source node through the route with the highest trust value 
2. Otherwise, if the node is not the destination: 
i. If the node ID is not in the source route of the RREQ packet, all of the node IDs in the RREQ route are 
inserted into its monitoring table. 
ii. The RREQ_C credit values are increased for all of the sender nodes and by sending the RREQ 
message forward, RREQ_T value for all of the receiving nodes is also increased 
3. Otherwise, if RREQ is duplicate:  
i. Delete the RREQ packet and insert the IDs of the neighboring nodes which have transmitted the 
duplicate RREQ packet 
ii. Increase the RREQ_C credit value of that node in the monitoring table 
 
 
 
4.3 Phase 2: Testing the routes 
Once an intermediate node receives a RREP packet, it copies the trust value assigned to the next node 
on the route to the destination. Afterward, it sends that packet to the previous node and this process 
is repeated until the RREP packet reaches the source node. According to the algorithm presented in 
Figure 7, all of the current nodes on the route from the source to the destination which send the 
response packet, increase the trust value for their next node in the RREP packet. When the source 
node receives the first RREP packet, it checks the corresponding RREQ packets to see if the response 
is from the destination or from intermediate nodes. If the response is from the destination, then it 
considers the route for packet transmission. However, if the received response is from an 
intermediate node claiming to have a new route to the destination, then the source node selects the 
RREP packet which has the highest trust value assigned to the nodes along its corresponding route. 
Our method, on the other hand, adds one more checkpoint for discovering malicious nodes in 
addition to discovering highly trustworthy routes. 
 
 Once the source node receives the RREP packet, it sends a test packet comprised of multiple 
blocks to the destination along the routes with the highest trust values. The destination is bound to 
send an acknowledgment packet for that route which includes the number of the received blocks. 
Each intermediate node in the route needs to count the number of blocks in the test packet it hands 
over to the next node in a Number of Packets Forward manner. When the destination node receives 
the data packets from the source node, it starts counting and stores the number of packets in the 
received data in a block. Obviously, if a route is infected by a gray hole node then the test packet 
will either not reach the destination at all or it will not reach the destination in its entirety. The 
destination IDS node sends the number of blocks in the test packet to the source node using the 
acknowledgment packet. Once the source IDS node receives the acknowledgment packet, it checks 
to see if the number of blocks is the same as the number of blocks in the test packet. If fewer blocks 
were received by the destination than the ones sent by the source, then the route is not safe. For this 
purpose, a parameter named ( )BHP r is defined. If the number of blocks in the acknowledgment packet 
for a route is fewer than the number of the blocks in the test packet or the acknowledgment packet is 
not received at all then the ( )BHP r value will be increased for route r. However, if the test packet 
reaches the destination completely, then the received acknowledgment packet will contain the right 
number of blocks. This means that the route does not have a gray hole attack. In this case, the ( )BHP r
value will be decreased. In the proposed method, the test packet transmission process is carried out 
with a predefined number of blocks. 
 
 
The initial value of ( )BHP r : If the route is verified according to the malicious node detection process, 
the initial value of ( )BHP r will be set to zero. However, if the route is not verified, i.e. all of the data 
blocks in the test packet did not reach their destination, then ( )BHP r will be set to 100. Afterward, 
based on whether or not it receives the acknowledgment packet, the source node updates the table 
for different routes according to Table 6. If the acknowledgment packet with the right number of 
blocks is received from the destination, ( )BHP r will be decreased by 50. However, if the 
acknowledgment is not received from the destination or it contains the wrong number, then ( )BHP r  
will be increased by 20. This process is repeated 2 times and ( )BHP r is updated for all of the routes. 
Then if the ( )BHP r value is higher than 50 for a route, that route will be identified as infected. The 
malicious nodes need to be discovered for the routes labeled as infected. This is carried out in the 
next phase of the proposed method. If the ( )BHP r value is lower than 50, then the route is valid. 
 
Table 6 Route testing. 
 
After testing the routes, the source IDS node starts discovering the malicious gray hole nodes along 
the infected routes. 
 
4.4 Phase 3: gray hole thing discovery in MTISS-IoT 
As mentioned before, in the gray hole attack, the gray hole nodes eliminate some of the packets they 
receive. A data control packet is proposed using this characteristic to check the intermediate nodes in 
an infected route. This packet includes three parameters as presented in Table 7. 
 
 
Table. 7 Fields of the Control Packet   
Node ID  ID NEXT−  
256  Hash SHA−   
 
 
 
 
RREP  Valid acknowledgment is received         Acknowledgment is not received or it is invalid  ( )BHP r  
1RREP  *   ( ) 50BHP r −  
2RREP   *  ( ) 20BHP r +  
The fields of the proposed data control packet in figure 6 are as follows: 
Node ID: This field refers to the ID of the node that created the packet. 
ID-NEXT: This field refers to the next node on the route to the destination. 
Hash SHA-256: In order to discover the malicious gray hole node on the infected route, the source 
creates an encrypted message using the SHA-256 hashing function and puts the encrypted message in this 
field. This message must be identical in all of the data packets along the route. Each node needs to 
calculate the output once it receives the message and then forwards it to the source IDS node and also 
send it forward with its own specifications. A hashing function gets a string of digits and letters and 
generates a unique output with a fixed length. The proposed control packet is some kind of data packet. 
Therefore, the malicious nodes usually eliminate this packet, just like other packets, and do not send it to 
normal nodes. Also, these malicious nodes are unable to send the correct output to the source node. 
 
Hashing functions have some important properties: 
1. Their output does not change for a specific input string. If you give the same message to the hashing 
function over and over again, you will get the same output every time. 
2. Finding the reverse transform is very difficult. If the output for a hashing function is available, it is 
almost impossible to find the corresponding input. 
3. Finally, the slightest change in the input will change the output entirely. Therefore, even if a gray hole 
node does not eliminate the packet, it will be unable to generate the correct output and send it forward. 
 
After discovering the infected routes, the source IDS node initiates the malicious gray hole node 
discovery process by generating a hash function. Then it sends the data control packet to the next 
hop along the route ( ID NEXT− ). Upon receiving the data control packet, each node needs to extract 
the hash function and generate a new data control packet with its own specifications. Then, send the 
hash function output back to the source node and send the new control packet to the next node. The 
output of the data packet which is sent along the reverse route is considered as the response for the 
original data packet. Once this response is received, if the received output is the same as the 
encrypted message then the source node updates its monitoring table and increases the _RREQ C and
_RREQ T columns corresponding to that node by one. This is because the data packets have been 
sent correctly. This process is repeated along the route to the destination until one of the following 
occurs: 
1. The data packet reaches the destination: In this case, the destination sends the ACK message with the correct 
output back to the source node along the reverse route. This means that the route is safe and there are no 
malicious nodes along this route. 
2. The received output is not the same as the encrypted message that was sent: In this case, the next hop node 
which has sent the output message (ID-Next) will be identified as the malicious node. The source node will 
identify this malicious node by its ID. 
3. The next intermediate node does not send a response for the data packet: This might be because either the 
node itself is malicious or the node before it is a malicious node and although it has sent a response back to 
the source, but it has prevented the message from being sent forward. Therefore, the source node needs to 
verify whether the node itself or the previous node is malicious. So, the source node asks both of the nodes to 
send their monitoring table and reviews their monitoring tables. 
 
 
If the column _RREQ T is set to 1 in node X and column _RREQ C is set to zero in nodeY (nodeY is 
the neighbor of node X ) then nodeY is a malicious node. By carrying out this process, all of the 
malicious nodes on every route will be identified. These nodes must be introduced to the entire 
network. 
 
4.5 Phase 4: Malicious thing elimination process in MTISS-IoT 
In the proposed method, after the malicious nodes are discovered by the source IDS node, the source 
node broadcasts a message containing the ID of the malicious node in the network in order to 
remove that node from the routing process in the entire network. Once the malicious node is 
identified and separated from the network, all of the nodes separate any routing information 
containing the malicious node from their routes and future RREP packets will not include the 
malicious node. 
 
 The proposed MTISS-IoT method tries to select the best and most reliable routes for data 
transmission by monitoring intermediate nodes. Furthermore, MTISS-IoT does not stop there and 
verifies the routes and intermediate nodes by sending test and control packets. The proposed method 
also discovers the malicious gray hole node and removes it from the routing process by using the 
monitoring table and sending encrypted control packets. The flowchart for the proposed MTISS-IoT 
method is presented in Figure 7. 
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Fig. 7 Flowchart of the MTISS-IoT. 
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5 Performance evaluation 
In following section, we show and discuss the experimental simulation results of the MTISS-IoT to 
prevent gray hole attack. 
 
 
5.1 Performance metrics 
In following section, we investigate the performance and effectiveness of the MTISS-IoT by a 
numerical simulation in NS-2. The results are compared with REATO and IRAD, and IMLADS 
approaches proposed in [13], [14], and [15] respectively. The notations of the considered for MTISS-
IoT are as Table 8. 
 
 
FPR: The FP is calculated by the total number of things wrongly detected as the malicious things 
divided by the total number of normal things [16-18]. Therefore, the FPR is defined as illustrated in 
Eq. (5). 
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FNR: The rate of the malicious thing to total normal things that were mistakenly marked as a normal 
thing [19-21]. Eq. (6) demonstrates the FNR  calculation. 
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DR: It is determined as the ratio of the number of gray hole attack nodes marked to the total number 
of existing gray hole attack nodes in the IoT. DR is calculated by Eq. (7). Table 9 lists the parameters 
used for DR [22-27]. 
 
Table 9 The parameters 
specified for DR 
Parameters Description 
( )True Positive TP   The TP is obtained from the whole number of 
marked gray hole attack nodes divided by the 
whole number of the gray hole attack nodes. 
 ( )False Positive FP   The FP is obtained by the total number of nodes 
improperly recognized as the gray hole attack 
nodes divided by the whole number of normal 
nodes. 
 ( )True Negative TN   The rate of the gray hole attack nodes being 
properly marked as a gray hole attack node. 
 ( )False Negative FN   The rate of the gray hole attack node to whole 
normal sensors being wrongly marked as a 
normal node. 
Table 8 Abbreviated notations Parameters Description 
 FPR   False positive rate 
 FNR   False negative rate 
 TPR   True positive rate 
 TNR   True negative rate 
 DR  Detection rate 
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5.2 Simulation setup and comparing algorithms 
Because of the difficulty in debugging and implementing IoTs in real networks, it is necessary to 
view simulations as a basic design tool. The primary benefit of simulation is that analysis is 
simplified and protocol is verified, mostly, it is evident in systems in large scales [28-35]. The 
performance of the suggested method is assessed in this part by the use of NS-3 as the simulation 
means, and the discussion on the obtained results is presented. It should be noted that it is assumed 
that all REATO, MTISS-IoT, IMLADS, and IRAD settings and parameters are equal.  
 
 
5.3 Simulation results and Analysis 
In this section, we analyze the security performance of MTISS-IoT under the four attack scenarios 
(described in Table 10). These attack is categorized into DoS attack. There are 500 IoT things 
uniformly deployed in the network area initially. Some important parameters are listed in Table 10. 
 
 
Table 10 Setting of simulation parameters. Parameters Value 
 Simulation tool NS-3 
 MAC IEEE 802.11 
 Transport UDP/IPv6 
 Wireless transmission range 50 metres 
 Traffic type CBR 
 Number of nodes, and Packet size 500, 256 bytes 
 
 
The main simulation settings for four scenario are summarized in Table 11. 
 
Table 11 The setting of simulation parameters for four scenario. 
Scenario #1 Scenario #2 
Malicious things rate 8% Malicious things rate 16% 
Coverage area (m x m) 60 x 60 Coverage area (m x m) 70 x 70 
Simulation time 500 Simulation time 1000 
Scenario #3 Scenario #4 
Malicious things rate 24% Misbehaving things rate 0, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25, 0.30 
Coverage area (m x m) 80 x 80 Coverage area (m x m) 90 x 90 
Simulation time 1500 Simulation time 2000 
 
 
Table 12-14 compares the performance of MTISS-IoT with that of REATO, IRAD, and IMLADS in 
terms of FPR , FNR , and DR . 
 Table 12 FPR vs misbehaving thing ratio. Misbehaving thing ratio FPR (%) 
 IMLADS  IRAD  REATO  MTISS-IoT  
 0 8.2 8.3 9.25 7.8 
  
0.05 17.5 10.31 12.24 8.3 
  
0.10 24.7 19.05 19.01 8.8 
  
0.15 34.67 27 23.35 9.3 
  
0.20 43.2 34.38 28.62 10.11 
  
0.25 56.3 47.6 31.88 10.5 
  
0.30 63.2 52.67 39.09 11.5 
 
 
 
Table 13 FNR vs misbehaving thing ratio. Misbehaving thing ratio FNR (%) 
 IMLADS  IRAD  REATO  MTISS-IoT  
 0 19.5 
 
7.93 9.005 7.8 
 0.05 20.1 
 
8.43 10.08 8.3 
 0.10 24.6 10.19 11.3 8.8 
 0.15 30.1 15.63 13.37 9.3 
 0.20 34.2 24.38 16.25 10.11 
 0.25 38.3 33.2 18.76 10.5 
 0.30 46.3 39.27 24.89 11.5 
 
 
Table 14 DR vs misbehaving thing ratio. Misbehaving thing ratio DR (%) 
 IMLADS  IRAD  REATO  MTISS-IoT  
 0 76.14 91.63 90.2 97.4 
  
0.05 
 
74.6 
 
89.49 
 
88.57 
96.5 
  
0.10 
 
72.5 
 
80.46 
 
81.8 
96.2 
  
0.15 
 
65.5 
 
73.35 
 
76.37 
95.6 
  
0.20 
 
60.32 
 
63.19 
 
70.43 
94.4 
  
0.25 
 
46.4 
 
50.34 
 
66.16 
93.2 
  
0.30 
 
40.6 
 
46.14 
 
60.67 
91.4 
 
Average values of all methods for all metrics under gray hole attack are shown Table 15. 
Table 15 Average values of all methods (24% malicious things). 
Methods FPR (%) FNR (%)  DR (%)  
MTISS-IoT  17.443 20.37  82.06  
REATO  26.392 27.23  65.91  
IRAD  29.77 31.058  57.134  
IMLADS  49.59 45.41  52.93  
 
According to Table 16, the average delay of all approaches is large at the first; however, after a while 
and few iterations, the decision-making time is reduced. The reason for this reduction is that in this 
situation, the convergence and delay become static. Totally, based on this table, we can conclude that 
the delay of MTISS-IoT is the least among considered approaches.  
 
Table 16 Average delay (ms) comparison of MTISS-IoT with other approaches 
Time MTISS-IoT  REATO  IRAD   IMLADS   
T=100  11.5 39.4 42.4  46.3  
T=200  21.4 46.2 51.5  56.4  
T=300  20.2 41.68 48.67  51.2  
T=400  16.09 35.23 42.5  49.3  
 
 
 
 
In the following, we evaluate the performance of the proposed MTISS-IoT method in the situation a 
gray hole attack occurs in the IoT network. The results have been presented in Table 17.  
 
 
 
Table 17 Average values for all metrics under gray hole attack 
 
 
FPR: Figure 8 presents the FPR of nodes participating in data sending/receiving operations in MTISS-
IoT, REATO, IRAD, and IMLADS methods based on network topology. As observed in Fig. 8(a), the 
FPR produced by the suggested design showed small and mild growth in comparison with the other 
three designs if the malicious things’ rate is raised from 8 to 24 percent and the range of normal things 
is from 50 to 500. The FPR of the suggested MTISS-IoT is below 12 percent while the number of 
normal things is 500, and the malicious things’ rate is 8 percent. Nevertheless, it is set to 47 percent 
for IMLADS, 24 percent for the REATO, and it is 31 percent for the IRAD. The suggested design is 
superior because of the quick discovery of malicious things and their elimination by normal things and 
source thing cooperation. Moreover, it is also because the suggested algorithm discovers gray hole 
attack and separates them from the IoT network. Thus, the FPR, which happens due to attacks, is 
reduced. As shown in the figure, MTISS-IoT decreases the FPR by more than 17, 26, and 32% those 
of REATO, IRAD, and IMLADS models, respectively. 
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FPR 30 60.2 49.67 36.09 14.4 
FPR 40 65.8 53.19 40.49 16.3 
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DR 30 37.6 43.14 57.67 84.2 
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Fig. 8 Comparison of the MTISS-IoT proposed scheme, REATO, IRAD, and IMLADS approaches in term of FPR. 
FNR: Figure 9 shows the comparison of the MTISS-IoT proposed scheme, REATO, IRAD, and 
IMLADS models in term of FNR in gray hole attack. (a) Number of Things (8% malicious), (b) 
Number of Things (16% malicious), (c) Number of Things (24% malicious), and (d) Misbehaving 
things ratio respectively. As indicated by the diagrams, the MTISS-IoT design’s FNR has raised a 
little. However, its value is so higher in the IMLADS, IRAD, and REATO. As observed in Fig. 9(a), 
when the number of normal things is 500, the suggested design’s FNR is below 18 percent. However, 
it is 25, 30, and 40 percent for the other three methods. In Fig. 9(b), when the malicious things’ rate is 
16 percent, it is below 22 percent in the suggested schema while it is 24, 27, and 46 percent for the 
other three approaches. In Figure 9(c), and (d) we observe that the adaptation capability of MTISS-
IoT is higher than that of other approaches. This superior performance can be attributed to mainly, 
MTISS-IoT detection scheme. 
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(c) Number of Things (24% malicious) (d) Misbehaving Things ratio 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9 Comparison of the MTISS-IoT proposed scheme, REATO, IRAD, and IMLADS approaches in term of FNR. 
DR: Figure 10 shows the comparison of the MTISS-IoT proposed scheme, REATO, IRAD, and 
IMLADS models in term of DR. (a) Number of Things (8% malicious), (b) Number of Things (16% 
malicious), and (c) Number of Things (24% malicious), and (d) Misbehaving things ratio respectively. 
The diagrams indicate that the detection rate in the three approaches is decreased according to two 
scenarios, particularly when there are a high number of attacks. This decrease is evident more in the 
REATO compared to other mechanisms. The suggested schema is able to discover all of these attacks 
with a detection rate above 87.5 percent. When the number of normal things is 500 and the malicious 
things’ rate is 16 percent, this result can be realized. When there are 24% malicious nodes in the IoT 
network which are using MTISS-IoT, the DR is about 83.13 % as shown in Fig. 10. In the case of 
REATO, IRAD, and IMLADS, the DR for all Number of Things is about 71%, 61%, and 56%, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Number of Things (8% malicious) (b) Number of Things (16% malicious) 
(c) Number of Things (24% malicious) (d) Misbehaving Things ratio 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10 Comparison of the MTISS-IoT proposed scheme, REATO, IRAD, and IMLADS approaches in term of 
Detection rate. 
The comparison results of the MTISS-IoT, in terms of PDR at different percent of gray hole attack are 
provided in Figure 11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 11 PDR vs different number of nodes at different percent of gray hole attack in MTISS-IoT 
 
 
6 Conclusion and Future work 
By an increase in the use of IoT as well as to an easy implementation of these networks, these networks 
are being increased by day-to-day. Therefore, the security was known as a necessary need for providing 
(a) Number of Things (8% malicious) (b) Number of Things (16% malicious) 
(c) Number of Things (24% malicious) (d) Misbehaving Things ratio 
the protected communications among IoT nodes. In order to overcome the challenges, there is a need to 
create a secure novel intelligent agent-based strategy achieving both vast protected mode and the 
performance of the desired networks. In this study, a multi-level trust-based intelligence schema using 
the cryptographic authentication was proposed to avoid gray hole attacks in IoT. The proposed scheme 
first verifies the trust level for the nodes in the network and then discovers and eliminates the malicious 
gray hole nodes using control packets. We investigated the MTISS-IoT scheme performance using NS-
3. According to the results of the simulation, the MTISS-IoT was highly powerful against gray hole 
attack. It was demonstrated that it enjoys a low FPR (below 11.104%) and a high level of security, high 
detection rate (above 94.50%), and low FNR (below 17.49%) in comparison with present methods. In 
future work, the use of Firefly optimization is suggested to further reduce consumption energy and 
malicious attacks on the internet of things. Firefly algorithm is proposed to cluster nodes and 
authenticate in two levels to prevent from attacks. 
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